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The Oxford Handbook of

LATIN AMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY

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
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CHAPTER 10

CATHOLICISM, REVOLUTION, AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA

STEPHEN J. C. ANDES

VIOLENCE and bloodshed scarred the human and moral landscape of Latin America's twentieth century. The 1910 Mexican Revolution resulted in at least one million deaths. Colombia's urban and rural civil war, *La Violencia* (1946–1958), produced another 300,000 casualties. In Bolivia, the Nationalist Revolution of 1952, remarkably benign by these standards, managed relatively few casualties. Cuba's insurrectionary period (1952–1958) claimed another 2,000–3,000. Authoritarian military regimes, backed by US money, materiel, and Cold War anti-communism, deployed increasingly sophisticated and repressive state apparatuses. In Brazil, twenty years of military rule (1964–1985) brought at least 475 state-sponsored murders. In Argentina, 30,000 were “disappeared” or killed in the so-called Dirty War, from 1976 to 1983. The dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990) in Chile led to 2,920 documented cases of human rights violations. In Central America, Guatemala and Nicaragua underwent civil war at mid-century and again in the 1970s and 1980s. In all, perhaps as many as 200,000 people died or were “disappeared” in Guatemala's conflict from 1960 to 1996. Nicaragua's successful 1979 Sandinista Insurrection resulted in 50,000 deaths, and the counter-insurgency waged against it in the 1980s produced another 30,000 killed and 180,000 displaced peoples. El Salvador's twelve years of civil war (1980–1992) added 75,000 to the list.¹ The terror of the Maoist Shining Path in Peru was perhaps matched only by government repression to stop it: 69,000 were killed and 6,000 “disappeared” during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). In short, Latin Americans suffered a century of civil war, violence, and death.²

Catholics were integral participants in the bloodbath. The Catholic Church shaped, and was shaped by, the cycles of insurgency, counter-insurgency, and state terror, which defined Latin America's twentieth-century violence. Religious commitments, rituals, and cultures forged political identities, melded with gendered, ethnic, and class distinctions, and colored social relations, marking boundaries within and between groups, communities, institutions, and Churches. This situation was not peculiar to Latin America. As James K. Wellman reminds us, "religion creates symbolic and social boundaries that include and exclude."³ Catholicism provided the rationale for various theories of "just war," while religious discourses strengthened, even sanctioned, the use of torture and terror in the interests of both Church and state. Catholics took up all sides in twentieth-century conflict, from revolutionary priests, accommodationist bishops, and lay counter-revolutionaries, to Catholic generals who massacred their own citizens with state-sponsored death squads. Yet, Catholicism also became a dynamic force in the emerging quest for human liberation in the region. Catholics established networks of protest against economic and social inequality, opposed poverty and exclusion, and decried injustice and disenfranchisement. Latin America's revolutionary century splintered Catholic political identities on an unprecedented scale. Conservative and progressive, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, belligerent and peaceful, the Catholic Church's Janus face was unmasked in the twentieth century.

Despite all the social upheaval, only three insurgencies resulted in revolutionary "success" in Latin America: in Mexico (1910), Cuba (1959), and Nicaragua (1979). All three of these insurgencies dismantled the old regime, established a new and durable political status quo, and implemented a profound reorganization of social classes and economic relations. Thus, unlike anywhere else in Latin America, the Catholic Churches of Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua were confronted with the reality of a revolutionary society in which they too had to vie for space and adapt.

Three interlocking factors, associated with revolutionary state-formation, were crucial determinants in pushing Catholic hierarchies, many lay Catholics, and some Protestant Churches toward a counter-revolutionary position: anticlericalism, agrarian reform, and public (especially non-religious) education. Despite the reforms of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), its progressive interpretation at the meeting of the Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM) at Medellín (1968), and the emergence of liberation theology, bishops in Cuba, and even more so in Nicaragua, reacted in the much the same way to the nascent revolutionary governments as the Mexican episcopate had responded to similar challenges more than half a century earlier. In all three cases, Catholics viewed the fall of corrupt and long-standing dictatorships as positive. But after initial enthusiasm wore off, the Church viewed revolutionary governments as inimical to institutional survival, theological identity, and a challenge to their role as moral legitimators of society.

Differences between Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua centered on the unity of counter-revolutionary forces. In Mexico, a strong institutional Church base before the revolution allowed a more sustained and long-lasting challenge to the state. In Cuba, a weak Catholic Church, although united in counter-revolutionary sentiment, forced the Church to adapt and cooperate to regain a foothold in the revolutionary process. In

Nicaragua, a strong organizational base did not allow a concerted counter-revolutionary threat to the state. The internalization of conciliar reforms in Nicaragua produced a more decentralized, and ultimately divided front, where a growing "popular church" aligned more closely with the aims of the revolutionary forces associated with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Latin American Catholic Church, as institution, was therefore predisposed toward counter-revolutionary opposition. Revolutionary social reorganization presented a very real threat to the institutional interest of Christian churches, both before and after the Cold War, as well as before and after the Second Vatican Council.

Despite marked continuity in Catholicism's counter-revolutionary position over the course of the twentieth century, the Church's relationship with revolution revealed a shift toward moderation. Scholars have argued that the shift occurred after the 1960s. In a recent survey of the Catholic Church in Latin America, John Schwaller contends that three main positions characterized the attitude of Catholics toward revolutionary social change after Vatican II and the 1968 CELAM meeting at Medellín.⁴ First, lay Catholics, priests, nuns, and religious brothers were counted among various rebel and left-wing political movements throughout the region. They embraced revolution, and justified the use of force for obtaining liberation as a defensive violence used against the "institutional violence" of social inequality. Second, conservatives, especially among the episcopate, worked to impede the pace of change, to fight against secularization, Protestant evangelization, and institutional decline. Third, the majority—moderates—caught in the middle, became more conscious of deficiencies in pastoral action, awakened to the plight of the poor in their midst, but were suspicious of the temptation to tie the Church to a particular political movement.

CATHOLICS AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION (CA. 1910–1940)

Catholicism's first encounter with revolution came in Mexico in 1910. Between 1876 and 1911, President Porfirio Díaz established relative peace and stability, albeit through authoritarian and undemocratic rule. Francisco I. Madero, a member of the landed elite, galvanized the popular opposition in late 1910 and successfully brought an end to Díaz's dictatorship in the spring of 1911. National elections were held in October, which selected Madero as president. He served fifteen months in office until a successful palace coup d'état by General Victoriano Huerta brought about Madero's downfall and the expansion of large-scale revolutionary upheaval.

The Catholic Church's position toward national upheaval falls into three phases: loyal opposition during the waning years of the Porfiriato; participation, although critical, during Madero's democratic aperture; and contingent counter-revolutionary collaboration with the regime of Victoriano Huerta. During the long rule of Porfirio Díaz, the

Catholic Church in Mexico experienced an institutional restoration, facilitating the hierarchy's moderation toward the regime. However, by the 1890s, Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891) focused the social vision of lay Catholics and clergy alike in Mexico. A younger generation of bishops, trained at Rome's *Pontificio Colegio Pío Latinoamericano* (Pontifical Pius Latin American College), returned to Mexico from European studies and organized mutualist societies, Catholic labor associations, and lay confraternities with a social bent.⁵ Lay Catholics and priests developed an alternative to the liberal state-building project.⁶ As Madero's 1910 Revolution removed Díaz from power, Mexican Catholics had already begun to work for change within the boundaries of the old regime. The organizing of a Catholic social movement at the end of the Porfiriato positioned Catholics to benefit from the democratic opening supplied by Madero's Revolution, but popular revolutionaries did not come from Church ranks.

Madero's democratic experiment allowed Catholics to organize a political party, the National Catholic Party (PCN, Partido Católico Nacional), in 1911. The PCN backed interim president Francisco León de la Barra for the vice presidency over the candidacy of Pino Suárez, Madero's chosen running mate. Although unsuccessful in electing de la Barra, the PCN had enormous success in the elections of 1911, especially on the state and local levels. Deputies were elected in states such as Jalisco, Michoacán, and México. Social Catholic reform legislation was enacted that sought to provide safety insurance benefits for workers and the ability for wages to be negotiated between labor and management. Catholic lay associations were organized, and gained force and momentum, especially the Knights of Columbus, the Association of Catholic Ladies, and the Young Men's Catholic Association (ACJM).⁷ The Jesuit Alfredo Méndez Medina, recently returned from European training in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, established the first modern trade unions.⁸ Catholics continued their alternative project to liberalism, but remained skeptical, and even hostile, to Madero's administration. Thus, as Madero's regime unraveled in February 1913, the majority of the hierarchy, and many within the PCN, rejoiced. General Huerta appeared to be a return to order.⁹ The Church was contingently aligned with the counter-revolution.¹⁰ From these circumstances arose a fierce anticlerical reaction from revolutionaries who mobilized against Huerta's dictatorship.

Anticlericalism became a major characteristic of the Mexican Revolution after 1914. Northern revolutionaries under Pancho Villa mounted sporadic violence against foreign clergy, especially Spanish priests, displaying a good deal of xenophobic fury in the process.¹¹ Southern peasant soldiers led by Emiliano Zapata were more benevolent, often carrying banners dedicated to the Virgin of Guadalupe. The Constitutionals, so called for their stated purpose in drafting a new National Charter, contained factions of Jacobin anticlericals, others of a more pragmatic stamp, and old-styled liberals such as Venustiano Carranza, who emerged as the First Chief of the Revolution.¹² This last group emerged as the Revolutionary "winners" and wrote a new Constitution in 1917. New, more forceful, restrictions on the Church were written into the document: prohibiting primary religious instruction, prohibiting political speech by priests, and empowering states to regulate the practice of the Catholic cult. By 1925, the Church was an

amalgam of contradictory positions: progressive in the efforts of many lay Catholics and priests to unionize workers, but counter-revolutionary in its opposition and rejection of the 1917 Constitution.

The Church's Obregonian renaissance came to end when the new president, Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928), directed his energies at implementing the anticlerical restrictions of the Constitution. The Mexican hierarchy declared a Church strike, a moratorium on the sacramental functions of clergy within Church buildings, until the anticlerical laws were modified. The beginning of the Church boycott was set to go into effect the same day that enabling legislation ordered by Calles had been scheduled: August 1, 1926. A Catholic defense league, the National League for the Defense of Religious Liberty (LNDLR), seconded the clerical strike with its own economic boycott. In August, the first reports of Catholic insurrection were received. Small bands of Catholics reacted violently to the local implementation of the anticlerical laws. The Catholic insurgency would be known as the Cristero Rebellion. Between August 1926 and June 1929, perhaps as many as 50,000 Catholics in thirteen states of the Republic took up arms against federal troops and their local government-allied militias, called *agraristas*. Approximately 90,000 combatants died in the fighting, mainly in the rural center-west region of the nation.¹³

The Mexican hierarchy, virtually unanimous in its decision to declare the sacramental interdict, was more divided in its attitude toward Catholic rebellion. The thirty-eight archbishops and bishops that comprised the episcopate at the time split between a small number of bellicose prelates who encouraged armed defense (four), a slightly larger contingent who wrote and spoke against it (ten), and the majority who remained indecisive.¹⁴ Theological rationale for armed defense drew from Aquinas's theories of just war: Catholics were within rights to oppose a tyrant to protect religious ritual and practice. Bishops Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores and Pascual Díaz, who had been exiled in the United States, increasingly viewed the Cristero insurgency from a realist perspective. They believed that without help from the Americans the rebellion had no real chance of success.¹⁵ When it became clear by late 1927 that the Cristero forces would not gain the aid of money or materiel from the United States, and that Cristero victories on the ground had not materialized, Rome actively sought a settled diplomatic solution to the conflict. A *modus vivendi* was reached in June 1929 through the aegis of US Ambassador Dwight Morrow, the two Mexican prelates Ruiz y Flores and Díaz, and the new Mexican President, Emilio Portes Gil. The laws had not changed, however—only an agreement by both sides to end hostilities.¹⁶

Mexican priests endured persecution in a number of ways. Relatively few became rebel leaders during the uprising; some of the most famous included José Reyes Vega and Aristeo Pedroza from Jalisco, José María Martínez of Coalcomán, and Federico González Cárdenas from northwestern Michoacán.¹⁷ These were the exceptions, however, and the clergy did not lead the rebellion. Many priests under threat of summary execution deserted their parishes for the relatively safe environment of cities. Nevertheless, a large number of priests remained in the countryside, ministering to their parishioners. Well-known accounts that state that 3,500 clergymen fled for the safety of the cities are overblown. Approximately ninety priests were executed during three years of civil war.¹⁸

These numbers suggest that martyrdom, although a potential danger, was not as common or usual as in other comparable conflicts, such as the Spanish Civil War, where some estimates set the number at 6,832 clergy killed in the wake of Red Terror.¹⁹ More common was what Butler describes as "a litany of minor vexations in a long, anxious human martyrdom."²⁰

Catholic organizations played an important role in Church-state conflict throughout the era. Since the waning years of the Porfiriato, lay Catholic associations gained in strength, numbers, and notoriety. In 1925, President Calles helped encourage a schismatic Catholic movement, which caused Catholic lay leaders to combine efforts and create a Catholic defense league. The LNDLR sought to provide for the civic defense of the Church, coordinate public opinion, organize protests, and disseminate pro-Catholic propaganda. An official memorandum was presented to the episcopate asking the bishops to support a strategy of armed defense, to appoint chaplains to minister to Catholic rebels, and to urge wealthy Catholics to donate funds. The bishops rejected the latter two requests, but could not deny Catholics the right to defend the faith with recourse to arms. The League, although it had built a nationwide network of affiliated centers, was unable to coordinate the largely autonomous bands of Catholic rebels. But rural lay Catholics took up the onus of the rebellion, many without formal membership or connection to the more urban lay Catholic associations such as the League. When the Mexican hierarchy negotiated the ceasefire agreement in 1929, members of the League would be its most vocal critics.²¹

Most Catholic rebels came from rural parishes and provincial towns, hamlets, and villages. Rebel makeup was cross-class and ethnically diverse. Only the wealthiest hacienda owners were largely absent from the ranks, belying the argument of the government, and some subsequent scholars, that priests led the rebels, supported by conservative landowners.²² Historian Jean Meyer argued that, economic considerations aside, partisanship in the rebellion was defined by religious commitments.²³ The rebellion was strongest and most sustained in the country's clericalized center-west. However, recent research by Jennie Purnell questioned this thesis, revealing that anti-Cristero militias (*agrarristas*), who were recruited from the same region, often declared themselves to be Catholic as well.²⁴ For Purnell, the answer lies in the extent of capitalist modernization, the strength of Catholic lay associations, and the continuity of local politico-religious authority. Partisanship in the Cristero Rebellion was therefore not predicated on religious commitments, but by political and economic cultures and traditions, historically embedded within the experiences and memories of communities.²⁵

The "religious question," what Ben Fallaw defines as "the place of the Church in a Catholic country after an anticlerical revolution," was not settled at the end of the Cristero Rebellion, and despite general Catholic acceptance of the regime that would become the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), it continued to be a problem without an immediate solution.²⁶ Catholic opposition to local anticlerical policies, socialist and sexual education promoted under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940), and agrarian reform frustrated the revolutionary regime's program of state- and nation formation. Sporadic violence continued during the 1930s, and a second rebellion, known as *La Segunda*,

recruited some 7,500 Catholics to again take up arms against federal troops and their allies. Vatican calls for pacification and incorporation into Catholic Action met with foot dragging, resistance, and outright disobedience.

And yet, both projects, forwarded by the state and Church, splintered the trajectory of Catholic activism. Many ex-Cristeros and lay militants joined the conservative Unión Nacional Sinarquista (National Synarchist Union), which continued to mobilize resistance to state projects. Because Catholic Action barely got off the ground until late in the 1930s, Catholics called for civic associations, which would boycott state schools, and provide confrontational, though in the main peaceful, modes of resistance. Finally, politicized Catholics, especially university students, helped form a political party called the National Action Party, founded with members of the conservative business, educational, and intellectual elite as a secular opposition party. The Catholic alternative to revolution therefore took a decidedly conservative, counter-revolutionary turn during the Cristero Rebellion and throughout the remainder of the 1930s.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE COLD WAR IN LATIN AMERICA: CUBA

The development of superpower rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union after 1947 exacerbated long-standing struggles over social and political arrangements in Latin America, and added a new dimension to the scope and reach of American interventionism in the region. The Catholic Church faced new challenges that superseded previous conflicts between Church and state. In the 1940s and early 1950s, Catholic leaders recognized the threat of socialist and communist movements, but the successful Cuban Revolution in 1959 made the threat palpable. The rapid radicalization of the Cuban movement, from anti-imperialist insurgency to communist state by the early 1960s, reverberated around the region.

The pre-revolutionary Cuban Church of the 1950s was institutionally weak, predominantly established in Havana, and lacking personnel. A 1957 survey of 400 rural heads of households found that over 80 percent never attended services, only a little over 4 percent went to Mass three or more times per year, and only 3 percent believed the Church would help improve social and economic conditions. The Cuban Church was an urban institution, with 85 percent of priests, nuns, and brothers ministering in Havana, often in elite religious schools. Catholic Action and the Young Catholic Workers (JOC, *Juventud Obrero Católico*) had made some modest gains in forming associations, with the latter claiming approximately 20,000 members. On the eve of revolution, therefore, the Cuban Church was ill equipped to direct the course of the insurgent movement, and would remain marginal to the revolutionary process in subsequent decades.²⁷

Nevertheless, many Cuban Catholics opposed the corruption and dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista (1940–1944; 1952–1959), and welcomed the fall of the regime in

January 1959. Members of the lay organization *Agrupación Católica Universitaria* even joined the Twenty-Sixth of July Movement in the mountains, as did eight priests.²⁸ However, the hierarchy was more cautious, and decided not to issue a pastoral statement about the insurrection in late 1958.

After Fidel Castro's victory, the hierarchy published a communiqué cautioning the government against "utopian egalitarianism," which was code for Marxism/Leninism.²⁹ During the course of 1959, Catholics felt threatened by two projects set in motion by the Castro administration: agrarian reform and education. Both programs inspired opposition from the Church. The bishops at first were cautiously optimistic about the agrarian reform legislation, and Bishop Enrique Pérez Serantes even approved of it generally. In June 1959, Jesuits organized a meeting of sixty-two members of the clergy to discuss the legislation. The majority emerged from the conference critical of the government, and afterward political denunciations of the Castro regime came increasingly from pulpits throughout the country.

Moreover, *Agrupación Católica* steered toward a more conservative stance and opposed agrarian legislation. In education, the hierarchy and lay Catholics were more unified. Castro offered a reform proposal that mandated a unified public and private school curricula. Catholics wanted guarantees that religious education would be protected, and feared that Marxist ideology would indoctrinate the young. As Margaret Crahan argues, the issue of Catholic education, especially parents' right to choose how to educate their children, became a major rallying point for government opposition, and an important cause of massive emigration to the United States by the mid-1960s.³⁰ Catholic reactions to agrarian reform and education legislation galvanized opposition to the revolution even before the government officially declared itself communist in 1961.

The largest public manifestation of Catholic opposition took place in Havana in November 1959. Approximately one million Cubans participated in the National Catholic Congress. Fidel Castro attended the opening ceremony, revealing that the government saw the Catholic constituency as an important force in Cuban society, especially as many political parties disintegrated. Many of the speakers steered away from overtly political statements. But a clear statement of opposition was announced by *Agrupación Católica* leader José Ignacio Lasaga who, in finishing his talk, declared: "Social justice yes; redemption of the workers and the farmers yes; Communism no!" The crowd responded enthusiastically, "Cuba yes, Communism no!"³¹ The confrontational stance deepened over the next months. A lay Catholic leader of *Agrupación Católica*, Manuel Artimé had organized the *Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria* in the final months of 1958. He then left Cuba and made contact via a Jesuit priest with a CIA contact. Artimé, along with several lay Catholics, three Spanish priests, and a number of other dissidents, helped lead the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. The failed coup solidified the counter-revolutionary credentials of the Cuban Church. Although the Church unified in opposition to Castro, its weakness and lack of popular support in rural Cuba prevented significant Catholic influence on the regime during the 1960s and 1970s.³²

The Cuban government's enclosure of the Cuban Church in the 1960s prompted some Catholics to rethink their strategy. Younger Catholics and members of Catholic Action

argued that the Church needed to reinvigorate education and work with the government toward the common good. Vatican diplomats and the hierarchy supported a slow process of détente with the Castro administration, even as the government sought to build alliances with organizations across the political spectrum.³³

In 1969, the bishops published two pastoral letters that criticized the US trade embargo and encouraged Catholics to support government projects. By the mid-1970s, the government published an explicit statement, incorporated into the new Constitution, which declared that Cubans could profess any religious belief as long as they did not align themselves with the counter-revolutionary opposition.³⁴ By 1986, the Catholic Church hosted its first large public gathering in nearly three decades, the Cuban National Ecclesial Encounter (ENEC, *Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano*), which hosted 181 church leaders—bishops, priests, nuns, and brothers, and numerous lay activists. In contrast to 1959, ENEC declared itself open to dialogue, still opposed to Marxism, but willing to cooperate with the government for the good of Cuban development.

In the 1990s, the Cuban Church continued to work toward rapprochement, welcomed the 1992 constitutional changes, which removed statements declaring Cuba an atheistic state, and in 1998 hosted an iconic meeting between Pope John Paul II and Fidel Castro.³⁵ The revolutionary environment forced the Cuban Catholic Church slowly to come to terms with the status quo.³⁶ Yet, rapprochement also represented a clear victory for the Cuban Catholic Church. Despite its institutional weakness at the time of the 1959 revolution, Church leaders and Catholic activists succeeded in pressing the Castro government not only to accept its existence, but also to allow a greater measure of religious freedom.

THE PROGRESSIVE CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA'S COLD WAR

Several developments within the Church in the 1950s, many preceding the Cuban Revolution, led some Catholic sectors toward a more progressive direction. The first was a shift within the Catholic Action movement.³⁷ The Roman model of Catholic Action was based on a corporatist structure (i.e., branches composed of Men, Women, Young Men, Women, Workers, and Students). Its most successful national establishment took place in Spain during and after the Civil War, and promoted a conservative orientation in the churches of Latin America. This came particularly through the avowedly non-party political nature of the movement, which had been especially welcomed by the episcopates in the region.

An alternative model of Catholic Action came to the fore by the 1950s in Latin America, based on the Belgian conception of the movement, developed by Cardinal Joseph Cardijn.³⁸ This promoted a specialized form of Catholic Action, focused on training students and workers. Cardijn forwarded a pedagogical strategy known as "see, judge, act." Through small study groups, Catholic students and workers, often guided by

socially committed secular and Jesuit priests, educated themselves in the actual social problems of the country, considered what steps could be taken within the actual contexts where students and workers were active, and then acted to produce change. What differentiated groups such as the Young Catholic Students (JEC) and Young Catholic Workers (JOC) from other older, established branches of Catholic Action was their focus on confronting social and economic issues within national contexts. In other words, JEC and JOC promoted a deeper knowledge of Latin American society, its problems, and potential solutions. Whereas the Roman model of Catholic Action placed a priori boundaries around certain kinds of action—often excluding political activism or labor unionization—from the movement, JOC and JEC allowed for social analyses to guide action, without preconceived notions of a separation between religious, political, or social activism.³⁹

The second factor in positioning sectors within the Catholic Church toward a more progressive stance was the development of the Christian Democratic movement. In the 1930s and 1940s, especially in Chile, Catholic social activists in Catholic Action began to seek an alternative to the Conservative Party, one that more robustly promoted the social doctrine of the Church and was distanced from the Church hierarchy. Influenced by Jacques Maritain's ideas on rapprochement with liberal democracy, Catholic Action youths such as the Chileans Eduardo Frei and Manuel Garretón, and from Venezuela Rafael Caldera, helped establish Christian Democratic movements in the region. In the course of the 1950s, these became more secular in character, detached from Church direction, but with the stated desire to implement Christian social policies as an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism and socialist economies.⁴⁰

Third, in Brazil and Chile, socially progressive bishops came to leadership positions. In Brazil, Dom Hélder Câmara established the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) in 1952, which in essence bolstered his position as a leading figure among his more moderate colleagues in the episcopate. In Chile, Manuel Larraín supported the Christian Democrats, and increased ministries to the working class. These successes enabled both in their promotion of a region-wide Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM). CELAM held its first plenary meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1955. This organizational framework provided a forum for new cooperation among Latin American bishops toward policies of development. Top Latin American bishops got behind an emerging mission to address social inequality, exclusion, and poverty in the region, often sidelining the older battle against secularization.

Added to the endogenous changes within Latin America, including JEC, JOC, Christian Democratic Parties, and progressive leadership of CELAM, was a new pope. Pope John XXIII's (1958–1963) call for a fresh wind to update the Church to the modern world encouraged developments in Latin America. John XXIII published *Mater et magistra* (1961) calling for social justice and integration of the poor, and he seconded this call in his opening of the Second Vatican Council in 1962. Then, in 1963, his encyclical *Pacem in terris* called for international cooperation instead of Cold War hostility. Vatican II endeavored to rework the definition of the Church, moving it from identification with the hierarchy toward unity of all the faithful, the pilgrim people of God, whose

mission was to journey alongside the world. The 1968 plenary session of CELAM in Medellín, Colombia, applied these findings to a Latin American situation. This was a major victory for the progressive sector of the Latin American leadership. The official documents produced by the bishops at Medellín enshrined the position of the Church as the people of God. It helped forge a new pastoral strategy focused on critiquing the prevailing system of social exclusion and poverty, and exposed the corporate nature of sin as reflected in social inequities.⁴¹

These institutional and leadership changes gave life to grassroots change. In Brazil, under Dom Hélder Câmara, so-called Base Ecclesial Communities (CEBs, *Comunidades Eclesiales de Base*) grew during the late 1950s and 1960s. These were essentially parish-based local meetings of Catholics to study scripture, support one another, and contextualize the gospel within their local communities. The base communities expanded after Medellín with official support from clergy and many bishops. By 1978, there were some 150,000–200,000 CEBs in Latin America.⁴² Moreover, an intellectual critique of Catholic Action also emerged. Former Catholic Action leaders such as Gustavo Gutiérrez in Peru provided a framework for a movement away from developmentalism as a strategy to address Latin American poverty. After the council, their theological positions radicalized, especially in response to increasingly repressive military regimes. Dissatisfaction with state-directed economic development grew from the grassroots, as lay Catholics participated in programs of consciousness-raising (*concientización*), developed by Paulo Freire in the context of literacy campaigns in Brazil, but later adapted to the CEBs to help “discern the signs of the times.”⁴³ CEBs became forums where gospel-oriented critiques of Latin American societies emerged. Using Marxist social analysis as a basis for understanding dependency and the failure of development, many priests called for liberation as a guiding theme to the pastoral strategy of the Church. The movement represented a shift, detaching the Church from relations with the state, and taking the side of poor, the dispossessed, and those who were oppressed by political systems that excluded them from participation in society.

The emerging liberationist perspective developed in dialogue with Protestant intellectuals and theologians in the region. In the mid-1950s, main-line Protestant missionaries in Latin America echoed much of the dissatisfaction with developmentalist strategies, embodied in American-led projects like John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Led by Presbyterian missionary Richard Shaull in Brazil, an organization called Church and Society in Latin America (ISAL) developed a “theology of revolution,” which sought to articulate a Christian strategy of rapid and radical social transformation.⁴⁴ Although the theology did not necessarily endorse the use of violence, Shaull, with the support of the World Council of Churches based in Geneva, provided an institutional forum in which many young theologians were able to develop their ideas.

Between 1965 and 1968, ISAL became a location where Catholic and Protestants theologians such as Gutiérrez, Juan Luis Segundo, and Luis Alberto Gómez de Souza met, exchanged ideas, and pushed their critiques of dependency theory in new, more progressive directions. After the Medellín conference, Gutiérrez and Rubem Alves, a Brazilian Protestant and seminary student at Princeton, were invited to a meeting in Switzerland.⁴⁵

Gutiérrez had been given the title of his paper by the organizing committee: "The Meaning of Development." However, on the plane to Europe, Gutiérrez changed the title of the presentation to "Notes on a Theology of Liberation." At the conference, Alves and Gutiérrez recognized that they were thinking similarly, that "the question is not development, but how to break dependency and create conditions for radical social transformation."⁴⁶ They presented jointly at the conference, and thereafter, participated in numerous subsequent meetings that brought together the leading theologians from the region. These included Hugo Assman, Juan Luis Segundo, José Míguez Bonino, and Julio de Santa Ana. Within this context emerged a multitude of publications, articulating an emerging "theology of liberation."⁴⁷

The development of a liberationist perspective encompassed a growing set of concerns about the place of the Church in the world, the nature of salvation, history, and a new pastoral strategy. Essentially, Gutiérrez and others reversed the traditional way of doing theology, arguing that praxis, living out the gospel in society, should be the true starting point of theology, instead of a traditional approach that privileged intellectual principles.⁴⁸ For them, the mission of the believer and, by implication, the Church was to emulate Christ's identification with the poor, and to participate in the liberation of the human person. This "praxis" of liberation, then, led to a need to understand the social impediments to freedom, the structural sins, institutional violence, and social inequality, which stunted the social and spiritual growth of individuals and communities. Thus, liberation theology provided a context in which dialogue with Marxism could be fruitful for both Christians and the political left.⁴⁹

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE COLD WAR IN LATIN AMERICA: NICARAGUA

In the 1970s and 1980s, liberation theology came under fire from both an ascendant CELAM leadership and from the Vatican during the pontificate of John Paul II (1978–2005). Meanwhile, insurgent movements spread in Central America, testing both the Church hierarchies in the region and the emerging Catholic progressive and radical sectors. Bishops would be challenged by the profound tensions caused by the implications of revolutionary change.

On the one hand, Central American bishops became increasingly critical of long-standing and corrupt regimes. On the other hand, prelates remained fearful of the threat of Marxist-Leninist ideology promoted by revolutionary movements. Progressive and radicals risked censure from bishops if they collaborated too closely with leftists, but were also in danger from counter-revolutionary repression and right-wing paramilitaries. Thus, Central America became an important region in which reforms initiated at Vatican II and at the CELAM conferences of 1968 and 1979 were severely tested. At Puebla in 1979, the bishops had officially endorsed the "preferential option for poor"

as the mission for the Latin American Church. But what exactly did that mean? On all sides, Catholics interpreted the mission of the Church in the last quarter of the twentieth century according to conscience and institutional necessity.

In the summer of 1979, a second wave of insurgency in Latin America, initiated after the Cuban Revolution, culminated in the victory of the Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional (FSLN, or Sandinistas) in Nicaragua.⁵⁰ The revolutionary success of the Sandinistas came after a long process of social and political conflict in the country. The victory was not an inevitable outcome. Four important factors enabled the Sandinistas to do what numerous other insurgent movements in the region had failed to accomplish: topple a dictator and establish a revolutionary government.⁵¹ First, the ruling Somoza family (established by Anastasio Somoza García, followed by his two sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle) suffered a crisis of legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s. When a massive earthquake shook Nicaragua in 1972, the government's ineffective and plutocratic response prompted widespread dissatisfaction with the regime. Corrupt officials stole foreign aid earmarked for disaster relief, which damaged support among the middle class. Moreover, repression and human rights violations increased under the junior Anastasio Somoza. In 1978, a leading voice for the opposition, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of the Managua daily *La Prensa* and scion one of Nicaragua's most lionized families, was assassinated in retaliation for articles he had published critical of the government; this precipitated increased support for the opposition against the Somoza regime.

Second, the FSLN, organized in the early 1960s, changed strategies, abandoned the tactic of mounting a vanguard insurgency, and developed support among the urban lower and middle classes as well as among rural peasants, building a broad-based coalition of opposition forces. These included progressive elements in the Church, such as CEBs, Catholic youth and university students, so-called Ministers of the Word (lay preachers), and numerous members of the religious clergy, sisters, and lay coworkers (Dominicans, Salesians, Jesuits, Maryknollers, and Capuchins). Reforms initiated at Vatican II and Medellín were metabolized by foreign-born clergy, missionaries, and were disseminated in social action programs and parish study groups. Thus, the process of organizational renewal within the Nicaraguan Church was accompanied by a politicization of a strengthening "popular Church," developed in dialogue with FSLN leftists and radicals, who viewed the Somoza regime as illegitimate and anti-Christian. By January 1977, the Nicaraguan hierarchy, led by Archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, published a document decrying government abuses against its citizens, including Church people, pronouncing that a "state of terror" existed in the nation. The following year, the bishops supported the moral legitimacy of armed insurrection to oust Somoza.

Third, the backing of Cuba and other Latin American nations aided the FSLN in garnering broad-based support both nationally and internationally. Finally, the administration of US President Jimmy Carter proved crucial. When the Sandinistas took Managua in July 1979, Anastasio Somoza Debayle fled the country, and Carter recognized the legitimacy of the new Government of National Reconstruction.⁵²

The initial unity of the Catholic Church in opposition to the Somoza regime splintered relatively quickly after the Sandinistas took power. Two extremes buffeted the attitudes of Catholics toward the revolutionary state. First, priests, sisters, and lay activists participated in the Government of National Reconstruction. Miguel D'Escoto, a Maryknoll priest, was named Foreign Minister. A diocesan priest, Ernesto Cardenal (originally trained as a Trappist), took up a position as Minister of Culture. The Jesuit Xabier Gorostiaga worked in national planning, while another Jesuit, and brother of Ernesto, Fernando Cardenal, became director of the national literacy campaign, and later Minister of Education. Edgard Parrales first served as Minister of Social Welfare, and then was appointed Nicaraguan Ambassador to the Organization of American States. Other priests and lay Catholics took up positions as well, supporting the Sandinistas' reformist project.⁵³ Second, the Nicaraguan hierarchy gave qualified support for the Sandinistas, but in November 1979 cautioned against the risks and dangers of the revolutionary process, criticized the national literacy campaign as a potential source for the spread of Marxist ideology, and urged the FSLN to build a multi-party and pluralistic political system.

Qualified support moved quickly to open opposition. Although priests helped direct many of the Sandinista reform projects, Archbishop Obando y Bravo feared the development of a one-party state, and the implementation of public education, aspects of agrarian reform, and compulsory military service. Many of the native-born diocesan clergy, Protestant evangelical and Pentecostal churches, and communities of Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists seconded the hard line of the episcopate, while more liberal Protestant groups, such most of them affiliated with CEPAD, the Council of Protestant Churches of Nicaragua, strongly supported the Sandinistas. Conservative Protestants opposed the Sandinistas on issues of anti-communism, military service, and public education.⁵⁴ The Maryknoll Sisters decried human rights violations against Nicaraguan people, an activist stance initiated during the Somoza regime, and continued under the Sandinistas.⁵⁵

By the early 1980s, Catholic participation in counter-revolutionary activities increased, as the Vatican under Pope John Paul II encouraged the Nicaraguan bishops' opposition to the Sandinistas. Political identities split between those in favor of the Sandinistas, many of whom viewed Christian principles within the reformist projects of the government, and those who opposed the government. Moreover, Archbishop (and later, Cardinal) Obando sought to reign in the radical elements of the Church, placing one parish community under interdict (i.e., a ban on ritual worship, including Holy Communion) for allegedly roughing up a bishop who had gone to remove the Eucharist from a Church occupied by lay Catholic protesters.⁵⁶

In 1982, John Paul II sent a letter to the Nicaraguan hierarchy supporting their critical posture, and exhorting the faithful against divisiveness and class hatred. A year later, the pope made a brief visit to Nicaragua, where he gave two public homilies, supporting parents' right to choose how to educate their children, and excoriated the progressive sector of the Church for being too ideological, radical, and out of step with the national bishops. He also publicly chided liberationist priest Ernesto Cardenal to that he "must fix his affairs with the Church;" at a large outdoor Mass later in the visit, Sandinista cadres attempted to drown out the pope with political slogans.

After Pope John Paul's visit to Central America, the Vatican ordered that clergy must suspend their priestly duties while served in political offices. Priests who served in the government were allowed to retain their holy orders as long as they did not exercise sacramental duties while in civil service. As the administration of US President Ronald Reagan threw its support behind the coalition of armed counter-revolutionaries, the so-called Contreras, Nicaraguan bishops developed contacts with right-wing political groups in the United States. As external enemies to the government grew in strength, the Sandinistas began deporting priests and nuns associated with the opposition in Nicaragua.

Yet by the late 1980s, North American and European bishops critical of the Reagan policy of arming the Contreras began to exert their influence on the Vatican, resulting in a new effort at detente facilitated by the papal nuncio in Managua. As other Central American leaders called for broad-based talks between all parties, Cardinal Obando was positioned to act as a mediator. In 1990, elections were held favoring the National Opposition Union, and the Sandinistas were voted out of power.⁵⁷

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The typology set out at the beginning of this chapter—conservative, moderate, progressive, radical—enable an appreciation of change and continuity over time. Seemingly, the radical position of some Catholics appeared new: the use of violence in the cause of revolution for the extension of the Christian cause. However, on closer examination, Catholics had used violence for political and religious ends throughout the history of the Latin American Church. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Cristeros in Mexico—conservatives and counter-revolutionaries—used violence waged in a "just war" against an anticlerical revolution. The pendulum swung from conservative radicalism at the beginning of the century, to revolutionary and progressive radicalism at the end of it. What truly appears significant in the relationship between Catholics and revolution after Vatican II was that the vast majority of clergy—bishops included—shifted into more moderate and progressive views toward social change. The conservatism of the post-conciliar Church certainly referenced the same institutional concerns as before, but even for them, the liberationist challenge had forced a reconceptualization of the Church's mission in the world. The Catholic Church in Latin America in the waning years of the century, and into the next millennium, continued to debate the meaning of the "preferential option for the poor," often appropriating and diffusing the radical edge of its original intent, yet still moving the Church in a more socially conscious trajectory.

A final comment helps bring this last point into focus. When Jorge Mario Bergoglio, elected Pope Francis in March 2013, served as Jesuit provincial in Argentina during the years of the military dictatorship, he was viewed as a theological conservative.⁵⁸ Unlike many of his Jesuit subordinates, he did not embrace a liberationist perspective. Bergoglio distanced himself from radical activism, and has even been accused of complicity, or at

least silence, as the military imprisoned and tortured priests under his control.⁵⁹ Bergoglio flatly denied these accusations in the Argentine press, arguing that he had provided protection for seminarians and priests in the Jesuit residence in Buenos Aires, and worked with the resources and influence at his disposal to calm tensions with government authorities. As Francis conceded, his vision of the Church's mission during the period was not as radical as many other Jesuits.

However, his subsequent biography sheds light on the evolving position of the institutional Church in Latin America.⁶⁰ First as archbishop of Buenos Aires, then as cardinal, Bergoglio evidenced a concern for social inequality in Argentina, especially as the economy crashed and rampant unemployment racked society after 2001. He reflects the synthesis of Cold War Catholicism: conservative on hot button issues such as gay marriage, abortion, contraception, and a married priesthood, but cognizant of the continuing need for a pastoral renewal focused on bettering the lot of the poor, the unemployed, and the victims of economic globalization. The coming of Latin America's pope was forged in the region's violent and bloody twentieth century.

NOTES

1. Gerald Segal's, *The World Affairs Companion: The Essential One-Volume Guide to Global Issues* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 233.
2. Residual violence in Colombia continued until 1964; see Marco Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002*, trans. Richard Stoller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 136; Michelle Chase, "The Trials: Violence and Justice in the Aftermath of the Cuban Revolution," in *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War*, eds. Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 167; Robert Sierakowski, "Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s," in *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*, ed. Immanuel Ness (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 2009); Iain S. Maclean, ed., *Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in Latin America* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 7, 11, 14, 17, 23.
3. James K. Wellman, Jr., "Religion and Violence: Past, Present, and Future," in *Belief and Bloodshed: Religion and Violence across Time and Tradition*, ed. J. K. Wellman Jr. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 5.
4. John Schwaller, *The History of the Catholic Church in Latin America: From Conquest to Revolution and Beyond* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2011), 243–244.
5. María Gabriela Aguirre Cristiani, *¿Una historia compartida? Revolución mexicana y catolicismo social, 1913–1924* (Mexico City: IMDOSOC, 2008), 64–67; Lisa Marie Edwards, "Latin American Seminary Reform: Modernization and the Preservation of the Catholic Church," *The Catholic Historical Review* 95, no. 2 (April 2009), 261–282.
6. Manuel Ceballos Ramírez, *Historia de Rerum Novarum en México (1867–1931)*, Tomo I: *Estudios* (Mexico City: IMDOSOC, 2004), 41–61.
7. Randall S. Hanson, "The Day of Ideals: Catholic Social Action in the Age of the Mexican Revolution, 1867–1929" (PhD diss., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1994), 133–134, 290–293.
8. Stephen J. C. Andes, "A Catholic Alternative to Revolution: The Survival of Social Catholicism in Postrevolutionary Mexico," *The Americas* 68, no. 4 (April 2012), 529–562.

9. Alicia Olivera Sedano, *Aspectos del conflicto religioso de 1926 a 1929: sus antecedentes y sus consecuencias* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1966), 48–50.
10. Robert Curley, "Slouching Towards Bethlehem: Catholics and the Political Sphere in Revolutionary Mexico" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2001), 198–200.
11. Robert E. Quirk, *The Mexican Revolution and the Catholic Church, 1910–1929* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 50–55.
12. Alan Knight, "The Mentality and Modus Operandi of Revolutionary Anticlericalism," in *Faith and Impiety in Revolutionary Mexico*, ed. Matthew Butler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 26–29.
13. The best survey in English is still Jean Meyer, *The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People between Church and State, 1926–1929*, trans. Richard Southern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
14. Jennie Purnell, *Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 96.
15. Stephen J. C. Andes, *The Vatican and Catholic Activism in Mexico and Chile: The Politics of Transnational Catholicism, 1920–1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 87–99.
16. David C. Bailey, *¡Viva Cristo Rey! The Cristero Rebellion and the Church-State Conflict in Mexico* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1974), Chapter 9.
17. Purnell, *Popular Movements*, 96.
18. Matthew Butler, "Keeping the Faith in Revolutionary Mexico: Clerical and Lay Resistance to Religious Persecution, East Michoacán, 1926–1929," *The Americas* 59, no. 1 (July 2002), 10.
19. Julio de la Cueva, "Religious Persecution, Anticlerical Tradition and Revolution: On Atrocities against the Clergy during the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 3 (1998), 355.
20. Butler, "Keeping the Faith," 31.
21. Ben Fallaw, *Religion and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 15–19.
22. Ramón Jrade, "Inquiries into the Cristero Insurrection against the Mexican Revolution," *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 2 (1985), 53–69.
23. Jean Meyer, *La Cristiada*, 3 vols. (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 1973–1974; Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
24. Purnell, *Popular Movements*, 73–110.
25. Matthew Butler, *Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico's Cristero Rebellion: Michoacán, 1927–29* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2–13, 214.
26. Fallaw, *Religion and State Formation*, 2, 10–12.
27. Margaret Crahan, "Religion and Revolution: Cuba and Nicaragua," *Wilson Center, Latin American Program Working Papers*, no. 174 (1987), 4–5.
28. Margaret Crahan, "Fidel Castro, the Catholic Church and Revolution in Cuba," in *Church and Politics in Latin America*, ed. Dermot Keogh (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 256.
29. *Ibid.*, 257.
30. Crahan, "Religion and Revolution," 9. The education issue was tied to an increasingly racialized discourse of anti-communism among exiles to the United States, as the Cuban government began mandating the forced desegregation of social and educational institutions and clubs; see Devyn Spence Benson, "Owning the Revolution: Race, Revolution, and Politics from Havana to Miami, 1959–1963," *Journal of Transnational American Studies* 4, no. 2 (2012), 1–30.
31. Crahan, "Fidel Castro," 253; Crahan, "Religion and Revolution," 12.

32. Crahan, "Fidel Castro," 258.
33. John M. Kirk, "From Counterrevolution to *Modus Vivendi*: The Church in Cuba, 1959–1984," in *Cuba: Twenty-Five Years of Revolution, 1959–1984*, eds. Sandor Halebsky and John M. Kirk (New York, NY: Praeger, 1985), 93–113.
34. Crahan, "Fidel Castro," 261–262.
35. Aviva Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 184.
36. Crahan, "Fidel Castro," 253–257.
37. Ana Maria Bidegain, "From Catholic Action to Liberation Theology: The Historical Process of the Laity in Latin America in the Twentieth Century," The Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Working Paper 48 (November 1985), 1–26.
38. John F. Pollard, "Pius XI's Promotion of the Italian Model of Catholic Action in the World-Wide Church," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 63, no. 4 (October 2012), 776.
39. Madeleine Adriance, "Opting for the Poor: A Social-Historical Analysis of the Changing Brazilian Catholic Church," *Sociological Analysis* 46, no. 2 (Summer 1985), 131–146.
40. Andes, *The Vatican and Catholic Activism*, 214–224.
41. Christian Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), Chapter 7.
42. *Ibid.*, 19–20.
43. *Ibid.*, 176–177.
44. Angel D. Santiago-Vendrell, *Contextual Theology and Revolutionary Transformation in Latin America: The Missiology of M. Richard Shaull* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010), 85.
45. Paul E. Sigmund, *Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 31.
46. Smith, *Emergence*, 176–177.
47. *Ibid.*, 116–117.
48. Gustavo Gutiérrez, "Notes for a Theology of Liberation," *Theological Studies* 31, no. 2 (June 1970), 243–261.
49. Smith, *Emergence*, 25–50; Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988 [1971]), 8, 60.
50. On the "waves" of Latin American insurgency, see Timothy P. Wickam-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially Chapter 9.
51. Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 165.
52. Schwaller, *History of the Catholic Church*, 254–256.
53. Margaret Crahan, "Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Nicaragua," in Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, eds., *The Progressive Church in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 41–63.
54. Phillip J. Williams, "The Catholic Church in the Nicaraguan Revolution: Differing Responses and New Challenges," in *Progressive Church in Latin America*, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), "68–79; Crahan, "Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Nicaragua," 50–51.
55. Penny Lernoux, *Hearts on Fire: The Story of the Maryknoll Sisters* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011), 239.
56. Crahan, "Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Nicaragua," 49. The Catholic Church holds that the Eucharist, after its sanctification by the priest during Holy Mass, is transformed into the literal body of Christ, and the communion wine likewise is transformed

- into the blood of Christ. This doctrine (known as "transubstantiation") is an essential understanding of the mechanism by which grace is imparted to the faithful through Holy Communion. Great care and reverence are shown to the Eucharist after its sanctification, and thus the protest at the church and the physical threat to the bishop represented a serious affront to Catholic worship.
57. Schwaller, *History of the Catholic Church*, 257–258; Crahan, "Religion and Revolution," 13–14.
 58. Jeffrey Klaiber, SJ, *The Jesuits in Latin America, 1549–2000: 450 Years of Inculturation, Defense of Human Rights, and Prophetic Witness* (St. Louis, MO: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2009), 298–299.
 59. Horacio Verbitsky, *El silencio. De Paulo VI a Bergoglio. Las relaciones secretas de la iglesia con la ESMA* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2005), 58–61.
 60. Sergio Rubin and Francesca Ambrogetti, *El Papa Francisco. Conversaciones con Jorge Bergoglio* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones B, 2013).